This paper seeks to draw attention to a flaw in the firm's Free Cash Flow model and related statement widely accepted in Corporate Finance. We argue that the common offset of any Current Liabilities against Current Assets distorts the FCF size, composition, and volatility, thereby misstating the firm or project size, debt and assets composition, financial leverage, risk profile, and estimated value. We demonstrate empirically that the offset opens opportunities to manipulate the FCF by systematically overstating its size and understating its volatility. We propose to avoid any offset and rename the standardized statement "Valuation Cash Flow" (VCF).
Introduction
The statement of Free Cash Flow (FCF) presented in modern corporate finance is designed to provide essential data for firm valuation. Consistent with finance methodology, this statement should present cash flow components generated (absorbed) by the firm's Operations and Investment activities against components of the same flow received (paid) by the Debt and Equity claimholders financing the firm. In a significant deviation from this rule, the common textbook presentation has the periodic change in Current Liabilities (CL), or a significant portion thereof, simultaneously subtracted from the periodic changes in Debt claims and Current Assets (CA), redefining the latter as a change in Net Working Capital (NWC). As a result, the explicit
truncation of the FCF generated by the firm's assets and received by claimants is associated with implicit distortions of the firm's size and short-term growth rate, debt and asset
compositions, financial leverage, and risk profile. The same applies to individual projects.
Apparently replicating the accounting-based Statement of Cash Flow (SCF), the underlying offset of assets against liabilities (hereafter "the offset") is inconsistent with financial-economic methodology and invites manipulation of the firm's FCF and estimated market value.
Our empirical analysis shows that the offset makes the FCF systematically larger and less volatile.
An average sample of 1,220 U.S. public corporations over 22 years reveals that the offset overstates the FCF mean by 33.7% and median by 128.2%. This result is explained by the typically large portion of total Liabilities made up of current Liabilities, representing 19.8% in the average firm and 24% in the median firm. We propose an offset-free Valuation Cash Flow (VCF), which eliminates those distortions and associate incentive for manipulations. U.S. firms are currently free to design and publish their own FCF reports. Since our study does not rely on data of such reports but on official Income Statement and Balance Sheet filings, our analysis is limited to identifying potential gainful manipulations facilitated by the offset.
Our expectation of such manipulations is based on a body of accounting theory and related evidence concerning financial statements in general 1 . Adhikari and Duru (2006) compare and contrast voluntary FCF statements designed by the firms themselves to be published side-by-side with their mandatory 10-K and 10-Q financial statements over the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Firms that engage in FCF disclosure are found to pay higher dividends, but are more leveraged, less profitable, and have a lower credit rating than matched non-disclosing firms. The same pattern is observed in the behavior of individual firms over time: Years of FCF disclosure are associated with higher dividends, higher leverage, and lower profitability. In other words, poorly-performing firms have both an incentive and a legal permission to design and publish their own FCF report side-by-side with their official financial reports, thereby mitigating the undesirable impact of the latter! The same bias is found by Wasley and Shuang Wu (2006) who investigate the effect of Regulation FD (Full Disclosure).
Introduced in 2000, this increasingly popular regulation states that dissemination of voluntary cash flow forecasts (not to be confused with FCF statements) must be via publication rather than private distribution. Management uses those forecasts to disclose good news of cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news of earnings.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Part 2 traces the erroneous FCF offset to the different finance and accounting methodologies. Part 3 analyzes conceptual errors and implied distortions inherent to the FCF offset. Part 4 tests for opportunities to manipulate the offset-based FCF by comparison to the offset-free VCF. Part 5 offers a summary and conclusions.
1 See Hackel and Livnat (1992) 
Free Cash Flow and the Accounting Statement of Cash Flow
Cognizant of developments in capital budgeting, portfolio theory, and corporate valuation, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB 95, 1987) 
The Offset Rationale

FCF Distortion
The textbook FCF statement subtracts the periodic cash flow of all or part of Current Liabilities (CL) from the cash flow generated by Current Assets (CA), juxtaposing any remaining CL and a composite asset identified as Net Working Capital. Our survey of finance textbooks revealed the following justifications for the offset.
(1) "Current Liabilities have a short life." Since the company is viewed as a going concern, the focus must be on the flow generated by contracts of any maturity.
Short-term contracts roll over more frequently, but remain a component of the firm's debt. 
Empirical Evidence
Most textbooks define FCF as follows: where CA and CL stand for Current Assets and Current Liabilities, respectively, the content of CA remains intact, and the content of CL may vary for the purpose of manipulating the FCF.
Changes in NWC and FCF are subject to full or partial offset, depending on whether the offset includes or excludes short-term "unfunded" debt. Since the publication of FCF statements by U.S. firms is voluntary, and the FCF content is left to the individual firm and can be changed over time, the range of potential FCF manipulations is significant. Our tests do not presume that firms in our sample were fully aware of the opportunity for manipulations.
Data and Methodology
Data used in this study are from two sources. The accounting information is obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual dataset, and the stock market information is from the CRSP monthly stock file. To ensure consistency in reported numbers and provide adequately long time series, we include all publicly-traded firms in the 22 year period from 1988 to 2009.
In Figure 1 , the graphs and related data present side-by-side the annual FCF and VCF of Chevron Corporation over two decades. Chosen as an example for its common features, this case demonstrates a firm's flexibility in manipulating the offset-based FCF in terms of its size and volatility. We have no evidence that Chevron Corporation took advantage of that opportunity. Table 4 explores the effect of firm size on differences among the three versions of FCF.
To determine the effect of size, we divide our sample of over 26 thousand firm-year observations into 5 size quintiles with an approximately equal number of observations in each. A positive (negative) offset difference would improve (damage) the firm's cash flow appearance regardless of whether VCF is positive or negative. As seen in the two smallest quintiles, the systematic negative offset difference deprives such firms of access to this reporting advantage. In contrast, the dollar and relative offset differences in the three largest quintiles is systematically positive and large, suggesting overstatement of FCF and estimated value. Table 5 
Summary and Conclusion
The immediate objective of this paper is to correct the FCF version adopted by corporate finance textbooks and preached for over two decades. This version calls for the offset of Current Liabilities against Current Assets, leading to the offset of their flows. We demonstrate that the offset can significantly distort the FCF in terms of size, composition, and volatility; leading to additional distortions in the firm or project size, debt and assets composition, financial leverage, risk profile, and estimated value. Our empirical analysis suggests that firms prefer the offsetbased FCF for its greater flexibility in projecting elevated FCF size and stability. Our narrowed definition of FCF eliminates this flexibility. The offset-free VCF is a logical substitute which would moderate the appetite for financial manipulation and better serve insiders and outsiders by providing more accurate and unbiased information. 
